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GREENWASHING NO MORE: THE CASE
FOR STRONGER REGULATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING
ROBIN M. ROTMAN*, CHLOE J. GOSSETT**, AND HOPE D. GOLDMAN***
Fraudulent and deceptive environmental claims in marketing (sometimes called
“greenwashing”) are a persistent problem in the United States, despite nearly thirty years of
efforts by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prevent it. This Essay focuses on a
recent trend in greenwashing—fraudulent “organic” claims for nonagricultural products,
such as home goods and personal care products. We offer three recommendations. First,
we suggest ways that the FTC can strengthen its oversight of “organic” claims for
nonagricultural products and improve coordination with the USDA. Second, we argue for
inclusion of guidelines for “organic” claims in the next revision of the FTC’s Guidelines for
the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (often referred to as the “Green Guides”),
which the FTC is scheduled to revise in 2022. Finally, we assert that the FTC should
formalize the Green Guides as binding regulations, rather than their current form as
nonbinding interpretive guidance, as the USDA has done for the National Organic Program
(NOP) regulations. This Essay concludes that more robust regulatory oversight of
“organic” claims, together with efforts by the FTC to prevent other forms of greenwashing,
will ultimately bolster demand for sustainable products and incentivize manufacturers to
innovate to meet this demand.
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INTRODUCTION
Many of today’s consumers, particularly Millennials and Gen Z-ers, seek to
purchase “sustainable” products and services, and some have expressed a
willingness to pay a higher price for “eco-friendly” options.1 They should be
encouraged to do so given the challenges of population growth, rising levels of
consumption, heightened scarcity of some resources, and the compounding,
deleterious effects of consumptive activities on environmental quality.
Unsurprisingly, multinational, multibillion-dollar companies have promoted
their sustainability initiatives in recent years. For example, in 2018, Starbucks
promised to eliminate plastic straws from its cafés by 2020,2 McDonalds
pledged to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 36% by 2030,3 and Nestlé
committed to making “100% of its packaging recyclable or reusable by 2025.”4
But can eco-consumers be sure they are getting what they pay
for?
The trend toward “green” consumerism in the United States began in the
1970s and 1980s when many Americans developed a heightened awareness

1. Sonya Sachdeva et al., Green Consumerism: Moral Motivations to a Sustainable Future, 6
CURRENT OP. PSYCHOL. 60, 60, 62 (2015).
2. Christina Caron, Starbucks to Stop Using Plastic Disposable Straws by 2020, N.Y. TIMES (July
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/business/starbucks-plastic-straws.html.
3. Zlati Meyer, McDonald’s Plans Dramatic Cut in Greenhouse Gases, USA TODAY (Mar. 20,
2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/03/20/mcdonalds-planscut-its-greenhouse-gas-emissions-36-2030/439755002/.
4. Press Release, Nestlé, Nestlé Accelerates Action to Tackle Plastic Waste (Jan. 15,
2019), https://www.nestle.com/media/pressreleases/allpressreleases/nestle-action-tackle-pl
astic-waste.
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of environmental issues.5 Manufacturers, and the marketing and advertising
firms working for them, responded to this new consumer preference by
touting the supposed environmental benefits of their products. False or
misleading environmental claims became more common, with some
producers changing their labels and ad campaigns—and nothing else.6 This
practice is known as “greenwashing.”7
Unfortunately for consumers, fabricated environmental marketing claims
can be more problematic than other forms of deceptive advertising because
they are particularly difficult to substantiate.8 While consumers can
determine, say, which brand of paper towels is more absorbent, they cannot
readily verify whether the paper towels are organic or how long they will take
to decompose in a landfill. Environmental marketing claims are also
complex due to the interconnected nature of environmental issues—
reducing one aspect of a company’s footprint does not mean that the totality
of its operations are “green.”
Despite these challenges, “green” consumerism continues to gain
momentum. “Green” goods have become a status symbol. A 2007 New York
Times article reported that the number one reason for purchasing a Prius is
that “it makes a statement about me” because “it shows the world that its
owner cares.”9 In a similar vein, a 2010 study found that consumers are
motivated to purchase “green” products when they believe it will elevate their
social status.10 And among young adults between ages eighteen and thirty, a
2014 study showed emotion often motivates “green” purchasing decisions.11

5. See David Gibson, Comment, Awash in Green: A Critical Perspective on Environmental
Advertising, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 426, 428–29 (2009); see also EPA, ASSESSING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET 3–4 (1991) (reviewing surveys in the 1990s of
Americans’ increased environmental awareness).
6. See Roger D. Wynne, Note, Defining “Green”: Toward Regulation of Environmental Marketing
Claims, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 785, 787 (1991).
7. For a discussion on types of greenwashing and its potential consequences, see Nick
Feinstein, Note, Learning from Past Mistakes: Future Regulation to Prevent Greenwashing, 40 B.C.
ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 229, 233–34 (2013).
8. See Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE
J. ON REG. 147, 150 (1993).
9. See Micheline Maynard, Say ‘Hybrid’ and Many People Will Hear ‘Prius’, N.Y. TIMES (July 4,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/04/business/04hybrid.html (comparing the
hybrid-electric Prius vehicle to the rubber “issue bracelets” that show support for specific causes).
10. Vladas Griskevicius et al., Going Green to be Seen: Status, Reputation, and Conspicuous
Conservation, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 392, 399 (2010).
11. See Maturos Kanchanapibul et al., An Empirical Investigation of Green Purchase Behaviour
Among the Young Generation, 66 J. CLEANER PROD. 528, 528, 533 (2014).
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This Essay argues that existing laws and regulations—facially and asapplied—do not fully prevent deceptive environmental claims in marketing.
Part II examines the history of state and federal regulation of environmental
marketing, focusing on the Guidelines for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims
(often referred to as the “Green Guides”) issued by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC or Commission). Part III focuses on the latest trend in
greenwashing—fraudulent “organic” claims for nonagricultural products
(such as home goods and personal care products). Part IV offers three
recommendations: (1) increased FTC oversight and improved coordination
with the USDA, (2) inclusion of guidelines for “organic” claims in the next
revision of the Green Guides (slated for 2022), and (3) formalizing the Green
Guides as binding legislative rules rather than an interpretive guidance
document. This Essay concludes that more robust regulatory control over
“organic” claims will not only prevent fraud but will also bolster consumer
demand for sustainable goods and services generally, and incentivize
manufacturers to innovate to meet this demand.
I.

FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MARKETING

This section reviews the history of regulating “green” marketing,
beginning with the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)
in 1914, which established the FTC’s broad mandate to prevent deceptive
marketing; the development of disparate state regulations regarding
environmental marketing in the 1970s and 1980s; issuance of the Green
Guides by the FTC in 1992; and recent developments.12 This section shows
that, although the FTC’s oversight of environmental claims in marketing
has strengthened over time, gaps remain, which are detrimental to
manufacturers and consumers alike.

12. It should be noted that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has promulgated
industry-specific rules and guidelines for environmental claims in the automotive, home
appliance, and residential construction sectors; however, those rules are outside the scope of
this paper. See, e.g., FTC Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New Automobiles,
16 C.F.R. § 259.2 (2019); FTC Energy Labeling Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 305.4(a) (2019); FTC
Automotive Fuel Ratings, Certification & Posting Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 306.10 (2019); FTC Rule
on Alternative Fuels and Alternative Fueled Vehicles, 16 C.F.R. § 309.2 (2019); FTC
Recycled Oil Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 311.6 (2019); FTC Labeling and Advertising of Home
Insulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 460.12 (2019).
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A. The Early Days
Deceptive business practices and misleading marketing claims have
existed for as long as there has been commercial activity. As such, the United
States has had laws protecting consumers and regulating commerce since the
1700s. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “fix the
Standard of Weights and Measures,” highlighting the early importance of
protecting consumers from deceptive practices.13 As businesses and the U.S.
economy evolved, so did the country’s needs for different types of consumer
protection. In 1914, Congress passed the FTC Act.14 The FTC Act
established the FTC and charged it with preventing anticompetitive,
deceptive, or unfair business practices.15
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce” and serves as the principal federal law promoting
truth in advertising and other marketing materials.16 The FTC deems
actions to be “decept[ive]” if there is “a representation, omission or practice
that [misleads] the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer’s detriment.”17 Section 5 enumerates the various enforcement
tools at the FTC’s disposal.18 The most commonly used remedy for unfair
or deceptive marketing is a cease and desist order.19 The FTC may also
pursue penalties or order corrective advertising.20
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
14. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 31, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”).
16. See id. § 45(a)(1) (declaring unlawful “unfair methods of competition”).
17. FTC, Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), appended to Cliffdale Associates,
Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/commission_d
ecision_volumes/volume-103/ftc_volume_decision_103_january_-_june_1984pages_103203.pdf. In 2015, the FTC issued an “Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted
Advertisements.” The main purpose of the 2015 Policy Statement was to address deceptive
formatting in advertising, and it reaffirmed the definition of “deceptive” first articulated in the
1983 Policy Statement. FTC, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY
FORMATTED ADVERTISEMENTS 1 (2015).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)–(m).
19. See DEE PRIDGEN ET AL., CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 12:1 (2019–2020
ed. 2019) (“The primary remedy of the FTC is the cease-and-desist orders. These orders
constitute a staple ingredient of FTC enforcement. It is also the remedy that has been in
existence for the longest period of time.”).
20. The FTC may order corrective advertising if the prohibition of future misrepresentations
does not sufficiently dispel consumer misperceptions. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d
749, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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With the rise of green consumerism in the 1970s, and the corresponding
rise in greenwashing, the FTC began deploying its enforcement tools to
address unsubstantiated and misleading environmental claims. Early efforts
largely focused on claims of “biodegradable” products. For instance, in
1973, the FTC negotiated with the detergent industry to establish an
industry-wide standard for marketing statements relating to biodegradability
and phosphorus content of detergents.21 That same year, the FTC issued a
cease and desist order against a milk carton company that had fraudulently
claimed its cartons were “completely biodegradable.”22 In the 1980s, with
concerns about the depleting ozone layer, the FTC issued cease and desist
orders against marketers that had wrongfully claimed their products were
“ozone friendly.”23
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Commission pursued enforcement
actions against fraudulent environmental marketing claims based on its
general authority under § 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC implemented these
initial enforcement efforts piecemeal, under general policy, which led to a
climate of frustration for both industry and consumers. At the same time,
states were promulgating their own regulations to address the growing
problem of fraudulent environmental claims in marketing, and state
Attorneys General and consumer groups were enforcing these regulations in
state courts. Ultimately, these fragmented efforts made it apparent that the
FTC needed to issue nationwide guidance regarding environmental claims
in marketing.

21. For a discussion of the “Voluntary Guideline Agreement” with the detergent
industry, see 1974 FTC ANN. REP. 31, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/r
eports_annual/annual-report-1974/ar1974_0.pdf; see also Roscoe B. Starek, III, Former
Comm’r, FTC, Remarks at The Alliance for Beverage Cartons and the Environment
Symposium (Dec. 4, 1996), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1996/12/federal-tradecommissions-green-guides-success-story.
22. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 82 F.T.C. 36, 38 (1973), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-82/ftc_volume_decision_82_january__june_1973pages_1-53.pdf#page=36.
23. See, e.g., Tech Spray, Inc., 115 F.T.C. 433, 434–35 (1992), https://www.ftc.gov/site
s/default/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-115/ftc_volume_decision
_115_january_-_december_1992pages_433-559.pdf (finding that spray-on cleaning products
marketed as “ozone friendly” in fact they contained ozone-depleting chemicals); Zipatone Inc.,
114 F.T.C. 376, 377 (1991), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/commission_
decision_volumes/volume-114/ftc_volume_decision_114__january_-_december_1991pages
_367-485.pdf (discovering spray-on cement product marketed as “ecologically safe” in reality
contained an ozone-depleting substance).
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B. Calls for a National Standard
In the absence of controlling federal rules, many states created their own
green marketing laws by the early 1990s to address rampant misleading and
unfounded environmental claims. While consumer groups applauded the
laws, the nonuniformity of the laws caused frustration for manufacturers.
States adopted different standards, which then interfered with interstate
commerce.24 In part, this was a question of stringency, with California
leading the charge—as is often the case when it comes to environmental
regulations. In Pennsylvania, a proposed bill allowed a product to be labeled
“biodegradable” if it decomposed after any length of time,25 whereas in
California, the term could be used only if the product decomposed within
one year.26 Yet, other states banned use of terms entirely. For instance,
Rhode Island prohibited “biodegradable” claims in product marketing,27
complicating the nationwide marketing of biodegradable products.
In 1990, both the National Association of Attorneys General and the
National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators were calling for
nationwide regulation of “green marketing.”28 Both groups adopted similar
resolutions requesting that the FTC promulgate environmental marketing
guidelines under federal law.29 Similarly, a task force of ten state Attorneys
General published reports in 1990 and 1991 calling for national
environmental marketing standards.30 Environmental groups also called for

24. See David F. Welsh, Comment, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State
Law: Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the “Green,” 81 CALIF. L. REV. 991, 995, 1017–18 (1993).
25. S. 920, 175th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Pa. 1991).
26. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17,508.5 (West Supp. 1993) (repealed 1995).
27. See Welsh, supra note 24, at 1002 (describing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.14-3 (Supp.
1991), which banned the use of the term biodegradable). This law has since been repealed.
See Act of July 13, 2000, ch. 282, § 2, 2000 R.I. Pub. Laws 1519–20.
28. See Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides; Public
Hearings, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968, 24,969 (May 31, 1991).
29. See id. at 24,968–69 (“By resolution adopted March 20, 1990 by the National
Association of Attorneys General, the State Attorneys General requested that the FTC, in
cooperation with the States and [Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)], develop uniform
national guidelines. A similar resolution was adopted by the National Association of
Consumer Agency Administrators.”); see also NAAG Urges National Strategy on Energy Shortages,
Environmental Marketing Claims, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 424 (Mar. 22, 1990).
30. CAL. ATT’Y GEN. ET AL., THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ADVERTISING 8–9 (1990); CAL. ATT’Y GEN. ET AL.,
THE GREEN REPORT II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
ADVERTISING 1 (1991).
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this type of regulation.31 Additionally, the Interagency Task Force on
Environmental Marketing Claims was formed between the FTC, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the White House Office of
Consumer Affairs (OCA) to facilitate coordination between federal agencies
on this issue.32 It seemed that all interested parties—from consumers, to
industry professionals, to environmental groups, to the regulators
themselves—agreed that some form of a national standard was necessary.
C. The Green Guides
By May 1991, the FTC had received four petitions for rulemaking,33 in
addition to other informal requests,34 asking that it promulgate a uniform
national standard for environmental claims in marketing. From these
petitions and requests, the FTC began the rulemaking process. The FTC
held a two-day public hearing in July 1991, along with an extended comment
period lasting 120 days.35 In the Federal Register notice soliciting public
comment, the Commission asked for comments on “what form” the
environmental marketing standards should take—ranging from increased
enforcement of § 5 of the FTC Act on a case-by-case basis, to interpretative
guidance, to binding regulations.36
The FTC ultimately settled on an interpretative guidance approach. In
1992, the Commission, acting pursuant to its authority under § 5, issued the
31. See Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides; Public
Hearings, 56 Fed. Reg. at 24,969 (“In addition, environmental groups have called for
guidance on environmental marketing claims . . . . [e].g. Environmental Action Foundation
Press Release, ‘Solid Waste Expert Urges State Action Against Bogus “Green Market”
Products’ (March 14, 1990).”).
32. Id. at 24,968.
33. Id. at 24,969–70. The petitions were filed by: Mobil Chemical Co. in September
1990; First Brands Corp. on February 5, 1991; the National Food Processors Association and
ten other trade associations on February 14, 1991; and the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance
Association with the Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers Association on April 12, 1991. Id.
34. Id. at 24,968–69; see also Manufacturers, Retailers Petition FTC to Adopt Uniform Labeling
Guidelines, 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 279 (Feb. 21, 1991).
35. Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,026,
37,026 (Aug. 2, 1991).
36. Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides; Public Hearings, 56
Fed. Reg. at 24,968. The FTC notes that the three possible forms of guidance in this case
include: “(1) Increased enforcement of Section 5 on a case-by-case basis and enhanced
dissemination of the decisions in such cases; (2) issuance of a trade regulation rule, a binding
regulation; and/or (3) issuance of interpretive guides, or guidelines as they sometimes are
called.” Id.
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Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, frequently referred to as the
“Green Guides.”37 The Green Guides are the FTC’s interpretation of the
FTC Act as it applies to environmental claims in marketing.38 They were
subsequently revised in 1996, 1998, and 2012.39
The Green Guides are interpretive guidelines that advise marketers on
how to properly make environmental claims. They set forth general
principles that apply to environmental claims about products, packaging, or
services, when the claims are made in the marketing or sale of an item or
service to the public.40 These principles direct marketers to:
1. Use appropriate qualifications and disclosures regarding
environmental claims.
Disclosures should be “clear and
prominent,” in “plain language and sufficiently large type,” located
in “close proximity to the qualified claim.” Marketers should
“avoid making inconsistent statements or using distracting
elements that could undercut or contradict the disclosure.”41
2. Make clear whether their claim pertains to the entirety of a
product, just one component of the product, or just the packaging.
The Green Guides provide the following example:
A plastic package containing a new shower curtain is labeled “recyclable”
without further elaboration. Because the context of the claim does not make
clear whether it refers to the plastic package or the shower curtain, the claim is
deceptive if any part of either the package or the curtain, other than minor,
incidental components, cannot be recycled.42

3. Avoid overstating environmental attributes or benefits. The Green
Guides provide the following example: “An area rug is labeled
‘50% more recycled content than before.’ The manufacturer
increased the recycled content of its rug from 2% recycled fiber to
3%. Although the claim is technically true, it likely conveys the
false impression that the manufacturer has increased significantly
the use of recycled fiber.”43

37. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363,
36,363 (Aug. 13, 1992). The Green Guides are currently codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260 (2019).
38. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552,
63,553 (Oct. 15, 2010).
39. See 61 Fed. Reg. 53,311 (Oct. 11, 1996); 63 Fed. Reg. 24,240 (May 1, 1998); 77
Fed. Reg. 62,122 (Oct. 11, 2012).
40. 16 C.F.R. § 260.1(c).
41. Id. § 260.3(a).
42. Id. § 260.3(b).
43. Id. § 260.3(c).
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4. Ensure that comparative claims are clear and substantiated. The
Green Guides provide the following example:
An advertiser notes that its glass bathroom tiles contain “20% more recycled
content.” Depending on the context, the claim could be a comparison either to
the advertiser’s immediately preceding product or to its competitors’ products.
The advertiser should have substantiation for both interpretations. Otherwise,
the advertiser should make the basis for comparison clear, for example, by saying
“20% more recycled content than our previous bathroom tiles.”44

Marketers must adhere to these principles, regardless of whether the
environmental claims are “asserted directly or by implication.”45
In addition to setting forth general environmental marketing principles,
the Green Guides consider how consumers are likely to interpret particular
claims and how, in turn, marketers can appropriately substantiate or qualify
their claims to avoid deceiving consumers. The Green Guides state that
environmental claims must be supported by a “reasonable basis.”46 They
explain that meeting the reasonable basis standard often requires scientific
evidence in the context of environmental claims.47
The Green Guides, by their own terms, are not binding regulations.48
Rather, they “help marketers avoid making environmental marketing
claims that are unfair or deceptive under § 5 of the FTC Act”49 by providing
“a ‘safe harbor’ for marketers who want certainty about how to make
environmental claims.”50
To put this in context, the FTC’s rulemaking power under § 18 of the
FTC Act provides that the Commission may promulgate two different kinds
of rules—interpretive rules and legislative rules.51 The FTC categorizes the
Green Guides as interpretive rules, meaning that they are “general
statements of policy with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
44. Id. § 260.3(d).
45. Id. § 260.1(c).
46. See id. § 260.2 (“Marketers must ensure that all reasonable interpretations of their claims
are truthful, not misleading, and supported by a reasonable basis before they make the claims.”).
47. Id.
48. See id. § 260.1(a) (“The guides . . . do not confer any rights on any person and do not
operate to bind the FTC or the public.”).
49. Id.
50. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363, 36,364
(Aug. 13, 1992).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (“[T]he Commission may prescribe-- (A) interpretive rules
and general statements of policy with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce . . . and (B) rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”).
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affecting commerce.”52 Legislative rules, by contrast, “define with specificity
acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive . . . in or affecting
commerce.”53 A full analysis of the differences between interpretative and
legislative rules, and the scholarship surrounding this topic, is beyond the
scope of this paper; however, it is appropriate to briefly consider the
significance of interpretative and legislative rules in the FTC context.
Legislative rules are subject to the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act,54 as well as additional procedural requirements prescribed in
§ 18(b)(1) of the FTC Act and in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act (FTC Improvement Act), which was
passed in 1975.55 Congress passed the FTC Improvement Act in the wake
of several controversial FTC rulemakings. These additional procedural
hurdles are intended to, and generally do, slow the FTC rulemaking
process.56 Since the passage of the FTC Improvement Act, the FTC has
issued fewer binding rules,57 and instead has increasingly relied on
interpretive rules or industry guides, such as the Green Guides, to avoid the

52. Id. § 57a(a)(1)(A); see also Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75
Fed. Reg. 63,552, 63,553 (Oct. 15, 2010) (“Industry guides, such as these, are administrative
interpretations of the law. Therefore, they do not have the force and effect of law and are not
independently enforceable.”).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B).
54. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 561–570a, 701–706.
55. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a). The FTC
must begin the rulemaking process by publishing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) in the Federal Register that contains certain information and invites comments and
alternative suggestions. The FTC must also submit this ANPRM to certain Senate and House
committees. In addition, before the FTC can issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the
agency must “make a determination that unfair or deceptive acts or practices are prevalent,”
which it is permitted to do only if “it has issued cease and desist orders regarding such acts or
practices,” or “any other information available to the [FTC] indicates a widespread pattern
of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b); see also TODD GARVEY, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2017),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41546.
56. In the wake of these new requirements, “it soon became clear that the MagnusonMoss rulemaking process was too slow to be of much use.” PRIDGEN ET AL., supra note 19,
§§ 12:12–14 (discussing procedural burdens imposed pursuant to the FTC Improvement
Act). It should be noted that there is an exception to this lengthier process; however, the
FTC is subject only to Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking procedures if
Congress expressly directs the FTC to promulgate the rule in question. See id.
57. Id. at § 12:8.
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cumbersome FTC Improvement Act requirements.58 These industry
guidelines occupy a middle ground between being truly voluntary and
legally binding.
The FTC’s decision to tackle deceptive and fraudulent “green” marketing
using an industry guide, rather than a binding regulation, enabled the FTC
to more quickly address the problem at a time when it was under pressure by
various stakeholders to do so. While the expedited action was a significant
advantage, this approach caused other challenges.
First, voluntary federal guidelines do not preempt disparate state
regulations. The Green Guides expressly state that they “do not preempt
federal, state, or local laws.”59 Although some state laws now adopt by
reference the Green Guides in some manner,60 the issue of disparate state
regulations still is not entirely resolved.61
Second, despite that the Green Guides expressly state that they are not
binding regulations, they read like binding regulations and the FTC has
sometimes treated them like binding regulations. The Green Guides classify
certain practices as “deceptive” and describe what marketers “should” and
“should not” do when making environmental claims in order to comply with
§ 5 of the FTC Act. These specific directions are arguably inconsistent with
a “general statement[] of policy,”62 as an interpretive rule is supposed to be,
and instead “define with specificity [unfair] acts or practices,”63 as legislative
rules do. To this end, former FTC Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga issued
a statement of dissent upon the release of the Green Guides in 1992,
questioning whether the Green Guides were legislative rules masquerading
as interpretative guidance.64
58. Grodsky, supra note 8, at 171. The FTC’s rulemaking history is discussed in detail in
PRIDGEN ET AL., supra note 19, § 12:12. See also Cooper J. Spinelli, Note, Far from Fair, Farther
from Efficient: The FTC and the Hyper-Formalization of Informal Rulemaking, 6 LEGIS. & POL’Y BRIEF
129, 133–34 (2014).
59. 16 C.F.R. § 260.1(b) (2019).
60. For example, Maine, Rhode Island, and Michigan have all incorporated by reference
the Green Guides into state law in some manner. In Maine and Rhode Island, a violation of
the Green Guides constitutes a violation of state law (even though, ironically, it does not
constitute a violation of federal law). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (2019); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.3-1 (West 2014);
(codifying into state law many of the Green Guides requirements).
61. See Feinstein, supra note 7, at 255.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A).
63. Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B).
64. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga Concerning Issuance of
Commission Guides on Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363, 36,368–69
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A third problem with the interpretive guidance approach is the difficulty
with enforcement. The FTC Act is the sole piece of legislation that grants
the Commission statutory powers of enforcement over deceptive advertising
and other forms of marketing. Because the Green Guides are nonbinding,
they “are not independently enforceable.”65 Therefore, a violation of the
Green Guides is not a violation of a legally binding rule pursuant to the FTC
Act, and the FTC is burdened with proving that each Green Guides violation
also violates § 5 of the FTC Act. A related issue is that voluntary guidelines
typically are not viewed as final agency actions, which both complicates
judicial review and reduces judicial deference to the FTC’s determination
that a marketer has violated § 5.66
In sum, the Green Guides were intended to curb the growing problem of
deceptive and fraudulent “green” marketing in the United States, and they
have succeeded in doing so in many respects. Companies marketing
products or services have a clearer roadmap for compliance with § 5 of the
FTC Act, and American consumers can be more confident that they are not
being “greenwashed.” This confidence, in turn, leads to higher demand for
sustainable products and can reduce the negative impacts of consumption on
environmental quality.
The form of the Green Guides as an interpretive guidance document,
rather than a binding regulation, leads to several challenges in compliance
and enforcement. The substantive purview of the Green Guides is also a
factor. While the Green Guides respond to some of the most significant
environmental marketing deceptions of the past—such as claims of being
“ozone-layer friendly”—they are silent on one of the issues that matters most
to today’s consumers: “organic” claims. The next section of this Essay
discusses the rise of fraud in organic claims, particularly for nonagricultural
products.

(Aug. 13, 1992) (“Even in the presence of express language disavowing agency intent to bind
either itself or the public, courts in this circuit have considered whether allegedly interpretive
rules are sufficiently mandatory and definitive to render them legislative in nature.”).
65. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552,
63,553 (Oct. 15, 2010) (“The Commission, however, can take action under the FTC Act if a
marketer makes an environmental claim inconsistent with the Guides. In any such
enforcement action, the Commission must prove that the challenged act or practice is unfair
or deceptive.”).
66. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (holding that agency actions are
final only if they (1) constitute the “‘consummation’ of the agency’s decision making process”
and (2) impose “‘rights or obligations’ . . . from which ‘legal consequences will flow’”). See
generally Stephen Hylas, Note, Final Agency Action in the Administrative Procedure Act, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1644 (2017) (discussing the challenges in implementing the Bennett test).
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DECEPTION AND FRAUD REGARDING “ORGANIC” CLAIMS

The FTC has jurisdiction over most claims made in interstate commerce,67
and this broad mandate encompasses claims regarding the environmental
attributes of products or services. As a practical matter, however, the FTC has
historically deferred to the USDA regarding “organic” claims. Because the
USDA focuses on agricultural products, this has led to a regulatory gap in
oversight of “organic” claims for nonagricultural products, such as
manufactured goods.68 This section discusses the potential for fraud in these
types of claims and recent FTC enforcement action that begins to address it.
A. Gaps in Oversight and Enforcement
An Interagency Memorandum of Understanding among the FTC,
USDA, and the U.S. Department of Justice, executed in 1999, defines the
agencies’ joint approach to oversight of competitive conditions in the
agricultural marketplace.69 Despite this effort at coordination, the agencies’
concurrent jurisdiction has led to confusion and gaps in enforcement
regarding deceptive or fraudulent marketing.
The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service administers the National
Organic Program (NOP), which in pertinent part sets binding regulations
for the marketing of domestic agricultural products (in contrast to the
purportedly nonbinding Green Guides).70 The NOP regulations define
“organic” and provide for certification of agricultural ingredients produced
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (stating the Commission may prevent persons, partnerships,
or corporations except for some banks, savings, and loan institutions from using unfair
methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts).
68. Agricultural and nonagricultural products are discussed at length in this Essay. 7
U.S.C. § 6503(a) prescribes that the “[t]he Secretary [of USDA] shall establish an organic
certification program for producers and handlers of agricultural products that have been
produced using organic methods as provided for in this chapter.” An agricultural product is
defined as “[a]ny agricultural commodity or product, whether raw or processed, including
any commodity or product derived from livestock, that is marketed in the United States for
human or livestock consumption.” 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2019).
69. Memorandum of Understanding between the Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Just. & the
FTC & the USDA on Cooperation with Respect to Monitoring Competitive Conditions in
the Agric. Marketplace (Sept. 16, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/coop
eration_agreements/ftcdojdoa-mou.pdf.
70. See 7 C.F.R. § 205 (outlining the National Organic Program (NOP)); see also Guidance
and Instructions for Accredited Certifying Agents and Certified Operations, USDA, https://www.ams.usd
a.gov/rules-regulations/organic/handbook (last visited Aug. 12, 2020) (containing more
information about organic standards and certification).
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under conditions that meet the definition. The NOP regulations also
include labeling standards based on the percentage of organic ingredients
in a product.71 Under the NOP, the USDA can suspend or revoke organic
certifications and impose civil penalties for noncompliance.72 Although the
NOP sets national standards for “organic” agricultural products, many
types of products and services that are marketed as “organic” are not
covered by the NOP—for example, home goods (e.g., mattresses, pillows),
personal care products (e.g., soaps, shampoos, skin creams), and dry
cleaning services.73
During the latest revision of the Green Guides, which began in 2007 and
was completed in 2012, the FTC considered adding guidance for “organic”
claims.74 It ultimately decided not to do so for two reasons. First, the FTC
determined that “organic” claims for agricultural products were sufficiently
covered by the NOP. The FTC explained that it “want[ed] to avoid
providing advice that is duplicative or inconsistent with the USDA’s [NOP],
which provides a comprehensive regulatory framework governing organic
claims for agricultural products.”75 Second, the FTC decided that there was
insufficient evidence of the potential for consumer deception: “For organic
claims outside the NOP’s jurisdiction, and for sustainable and natural claims,

71. 7 C.F.R. § 205.300–.311.
72. Id. § 205.662(g)(1).
73. Readers may be wondering about the role of the FDA with regard to “organic”
products. In brief, the FDA does not regulate use of the term “organic” on food labels, cosmetics,
or other products under its jurisdiction. While the FDA regulates other aspects of these products
pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act, it defers to the USDA NOP on use of the term “organic.” See “Organic” Cosmetics, FDA (Mar.
8, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-labeling-claims/organic-cosmetics.
74. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552,
63,581 (Oct. 15, 2010) (“The Commission asked commenters to discuss whether and how the
Guides should be modified to address the use of environmental marketing claims that either
are new or were not common during the last Guides review. Commenters discussed five types
of claims: (1) sustainable; (2) organic/natural; (3) made with renewable materials; (4) made
with renewable energy; and (5) carbon offsets.”); see also Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,122, 62,122 (Oct. 11, 2012) (describing how the agency’s
final rule was changed as a result of the comments received); Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues
Revised “Green Guides” (Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Green Guides Press Release],
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/10/ftc-issues-revised-green-guides
(explaining that the FTC declined to address use of the term “organic” in the Guides because
the agency wanted to avoid issuing a guidance that contradicts USDA).
75. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,124; see
also Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,585–86.

08. ALR 72.3_ROTMAN (ARTICLE) (DO NOT DELETE)

432

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

8/22/2020 11:30 PM

[72:3

the Commission lacks sufficient evidence on which to base general
guidance.”76
The purported “lack of evidence” regarding fraud and deception in
“organic” marketing of nonagricultural products prompted the FTC and
USDA to co-fund a study aimed at better understanding consumer
perception of such claims. The Joint Staff Report summarizing the study
stated that “FTC staff initiated the study to determine whether to
recommend updates to the FTC’s Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims.”77 The Report noted that “[a]lthough NOP regulates
organic claims for agricultural products, products either partially or entirely
consisting of non-agricultural components do not generally fall within the
core of the USDA’s program, and the FTC’s Guides currently do not provide
guidance regarding organic claims for such products.”78
The Report, an internet-based study, surveyed over 8,000 individuals.79
The study tested consumer perception of what an “organic” claim implies
about the content of a nonagricultural product.80 It also tested consumer
beliefs regarding the regulation of “organic” claims.81
In pertinent part, the study found that a “significant proportion” of
consumers surveyed believe that if a nonagricultural product contains even
trace amounts of man-made chemicals, then an unqualified “organic” claim
for that product is misleading.82 Also noteworthy were the study’s findings
regarding perceptions of government regulation. Approximately “30% of
[respondents] believe[d]”—incorrectly—“that ‘organic’ claims for []

76. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,124; see also
Press Release, FTC, supra note 74 (“[E]ither because the FTC lacks a sufficient basis to provide
meaningful guidance or wants to avoid proposing guidance that duplicates or contradicts rules
or guidance of other agencies, the Guides do not address use of the terms ‘sustainable,’ ‘natural,’
and ‘organic.’”); Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,586
(stating that the Commission cannot prohibit marketers from using the term “natural” in the
absence of evidence that demonstrates use of the term is always deceptive).
77. BUREAU OF ECON. & BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FTC, CONSUMER PERCEPTION
OF “RECYCLED CONTENT” AND “ORGANIC” CLAIMS 1 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/consumer-perception-recycled-content-organic-claims-joint-staffreport-federal-trade-commission/consumer_perception_of_recycled_content_and_organic
_2016-08-10.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 5, 7.
80. Id. at 10–12, 14.
81. Id. at 10–12.
82. Id. at 31.
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shampoo[s] [and] mattresses are certified by the USDA.”83 The Joint Staff
Report concluded the study results were “sufficiently robust to consider these
organic issues further.”84
To this end, the Report announced that “the FTC and USDA [would]
hold a public roundtable . . . to explore organic claims for non-food
products, and how we can work together to reduce deceptive organic
claims.”85 The roundtable took place in October 2016 with industry
members, environmental groups, government agencies, and academics in
attendance. Participants emphasized the importance of maintaining the
integrity of “organic” claims not only for consumer protection but also to
maintain fair competition in the market.86 For example, Scott Faber, Vice
President for Government Affairs for Environmental Working Group,
explained that many consumers misunderstand “organic” claims when they
are made in reference to nonagricultural products.87 Additionally, Angela
Jagiello, Associate Director of Conference and Product Development at the
Organic Trade Association (OTA), noted that in an OTA survey, 60% of
participants strongly agreed that “a certification process such as the USDA
uses to oversee and enforce the labeling of organic foods should also be used
to oversee and enforce the labeling of organic non-food, and products and
services.”88 At the same time that the FTC was conducting the consumer
study and public roundtable, it was also preparing to bring its first
enforcement actions for deceptive “organic” claims, as described in the
following section.

83. Id. at 38. Approximately 36–40% of respondents did not believe these products were
regulated by the USDA, and the remainder of respondents reported being unsure. Id.
84. Id. at 4. The study also surveyed consumer perception of “recycled content” claims,
and ultimately determined that further FTC guidance on that subject was not necessary. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Consumer Perceptions of “Organic” Claims Roundtable, FTC (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/10/consumer-perceptionsorganic-claims-ftc-usda-roundtable; see also Transcript for FTC Organic Claims Roundtable,
Segment 1, FTC (Oct. 20, 2016) [hereinafter FTC Roundtable Transcript Part 1],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/videos/consumer-perceptions-organicclaims-roundtable-part-1/ftc_organic_claims_roundtable_-_transcript_segment_1.pdf;
Transcript for FTC Organic Claims Roundtable, Segment 2, FTC (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/videos/consumer-perceptions-organicclaims-roundtable-part-2/ftc_organic_claims_roundtable_-_transcript_segment_2.pdf.
87. FTC Roundtable Transcript Part1, supra note 86.
88. Id.
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B. In the Matter of Moonlight Slumber, LLC and FTC v.
Truly Organic Inc.
The potential for consumer confusion or deception surrounding “organic”
claims for nonagricultural products, as documented by the FTC/USDA
study and roundtable, proved to be well-founded. In 2017, the FTC brought
its first enforcement action for fraudulent “organic” claims in In the Matter of
Moonlight Slumber, LLC.89 Two years later, the FTC brought its second
enforcement action for fraudulent “organic” claims in FTC v. Truly Organic
Inc.,90 and recovered over $1.75 million in penalties.91
To be clear, the FTC has been actively combating other forms of
greenwashing for years, and those cases inform the FTC’s current approach
towards fraudulent “organic” claims. For example, in 2013, the court
ordered marketers of a fuel additive to pay $800,000 in consumer redress
due to unsubstantiated claims that their Enviro Tabs would increase fuel
efficiency and reduce air emissions.92 In 2014, the FTC settled charges
against a diaper manufacturer that had falsely claimed its products were
“100% biodegradable,” “‘certified’ biodegradable,” and “compostable.”93
That same year, the FTC entered a Consent Order with a manufacturer of
plastic lumber that had “misled consumers and distributors about the
recycled content, post-consumer recycled content, and recyclability of its

89. 164 F.T.C. 869 (2017) (Complaint), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/co
mmission_decision_volumes/volume-164/vol164complete.pdf.
90. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Truly
Organic Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23832 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2019).
91. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment; Order
Closing Case at 3, FTC v. Truly Organic Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23832 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2019).
92. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment Against Green
Foot Global, LLC, William C. Hyman, and Mary Ann P. Hyman at 3, 4–6, FTC v. Green
Foot Glob., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-02064 (D. Nev. Nov. 19, 2013); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC
Sends Refunds to Consumers Duped by Marketers Who Claimed Fuel Additive Could
Drastically Increase Fuel Economy and Reduce Emissions (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.ftc.g
ov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-sends-refunds-consumers-duped-marketers-whoclaimed-fuel.
93. Down to Earth Designs, Inc., 157 F.T.C. 476, 510–13 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/sy
stem/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-157/ftc_volume_decision_157
_jan_-_jun_2014pages_462-630.pdf; see also Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Order
Settling Charges that Down to Earth Designs, Inc. Made Deceptive Environmental Claims for
its Diapers and Related Products (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/03/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-down-earth-designs-inc.
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products.”94 Another case of note, from 2016, involved an FTC cease and
desist order against a sunscreen manufacturer that had falsely claimed its
product was “100% natural.”95 And finally, in 2018, the FTC entered a
Consent Order in In the Matter of Benjamin Moore & Co., Inc.96 The paint
company falsely claimed that its products would not emit volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) or other harmful chemicals and marketed its products
using self-awarded environmental seals.97
What sets Moonlight Slumber and Truly Organic apart is that they were the
first enforcement actions by the FTC to tackle the burgeoning problem of
false or deceptive “organic claims.” In 2017, the FTC issued a four-count
complaint against Moonlight Slumber, LLC (Moonlight Slumber), an Illinois
corporation that manufactures baby mattresses and maternity pillows at its
factory near Chicago, and sells them throughout the United States.98 The
complaint was based on the FTC’s authority to prevent deceptive claims in
marketing under § 5(a) of the FTC Act.99 The claims alleged included:
1. Moonlight Slumber had falsely advertised its baby mattresses as
“organic,” “natural,” and “plant-based.”100

94. N.E.W. Plastics Corp., 157 F.T.C. 900, 922 (2014); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC
Approves Final Order Settling Charges That N.E.W. Plastics’ Claims for Its Plastic Lumber
Products Were Misleading (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/04/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-new-plastics.
95. Cal. Naturel, Inc., 162 F.T.C. 1066, 1070–71 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/fil
es/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-162/vol162complete.pdf; see also Press
Release, FTC, FTC Rules California Naturel, Inc. Misled Consumers, Violated the FTC Act
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/ftc-rules-californianaturel-inc-misled-consumers-violated-ftc.
96. 165 F.T.C. 731 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/commission_de
cision_volumes/volume-165/ftc_volume_decision_165_jan_-_jun_2018pages_725-969.pdf.
97. Id. at 750–52, 761; see also Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Consent Orders
Settling Charges That Four Paint Companies Misled Consumers Through Claims Their
Products Are Emission- and VOC-Free (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2018/04/ftc-approves-final-consent-orders-settling-charges-four-paint.
98. Moonlight Slumber, LLC, 164 F.T.C. 869 (2017) (Complaint), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-164/vol164complete.pdf.
Moonlight Slumber, LLC is now doing business as “Moonlight.”
99. Id. at 874.
100. Id. at 870, ¶ 4(a)–(e). The FTC alleged that, in reality, “[t]he substantial majority of
content in Respondent’s Starlight Simplicity and Little Star mattresses is nonorganic . . . . Only the mattress ribbon, a minor component of the mattresses, is purely
organic.” Id. at 871, ¶ 6. It continued: “Most of Respondent’s mattresses contain cores made
wholly or substantially of polyurethane, a non-natural material made almost entirely from
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2. Moonlight Slumber had falsely claimed that testing had proven its
mattresses do not emit VOCs, when in fact there was no testing to
substantiate that claim.101
3. Moonlight Slumber had represented that its mattresses were certified
by Green Safety Shield, but “failed to disclose . . . adequately that
the Green Safety Shield is its own designation” and not a
certification from an independent third party.102
On October 4, 2017, the FTC published a Federal Register notice seeking
public comment regarding the draft Consent Agreement and Consent
Order.103 During the thirty-day comment period, the FTC received only one
comment, which was from the OTA.104 The OTA expressed support for the
proposed Consent Agreement, remarking that “[c]onsumer demand for
organic products continues to show double-digit growth with no signs of
slowing,” and that this “provides great incentive for marketers to take
advantage of the term ‘organic’ and apply it to products that may contain
little to no ‘organic’ material.”105 In its comment, the OTA suggested that
the FTC develop a draft policy statement regarding “organic” claims for
nonagricultural and partially nonagricultural products, noting that these
products are outside the scope of the USDA’s jurisdiction under the NOP,106
leaving a “largely undefined and unregulated space.”107

isocyanates and polyols derived from petrochemicals.” Id. ¶ 7. In addition, the FTC asserted
that “the latex used in the core for the Little Star mattress is not a natural material, but is
synthetic.” Id. Further, “[t]he foams used in Respondent’s Starlight Supreme, Starlight
Sleepwell, Starlight Dream, Little Star, Little Dreamer, Little Dreamer Deluxe, and Little
Angel mattresses contain little or no plant-based material.” Id. ¶ 8.
101. See id. at 873 (“Respondent has represented . . . that [its] mattresses will not emit any
substance, including volatile organic compounds. In fact, Respondent did not possess and
rely upon a reasonable basis to substantiate that its mattresses will not emit any substance,
including volatile organic compounds.”).
102. Id. at 874.
103. Moonlight Slumber, LLC; Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,243,
46,243 (Oct. 4, 2017).
104. Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Consent Order in Moonlight Slumber,
LLC, Advertising Case (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/20
17/12/ftc-approves-final-consent-order-moonlight-slumber-llc.
105. Letter from Gwendolyn Wyard, Vice President, Organic Trade Ass’n, to Off. of the
Sec’y, FTC 1, 4 (Oct. 27, 2017), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2017
/10/00002-141568.pdf (commenting on FTC’s proposed consent agreement to settle charges).
106. Id. at 2–3.
107. Id. at 1.
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The Consent Order, entered on December 11, 2017, prohibits Moonlight
Slumber from continuing to engage in deceptive environmental marketing
practices.108 It also provides that Moonlight Slumber may be liable for civil
penalties for future violations of the Consent Order.109
Truly Organic involves similar issues. The USDA started the Truly Organic
investigation, with later involvement by the FTC. Truly Organic Inc. (Truly
Organic), a Florida corporation, packages and labels personal care products
(e.g., body wash, baby lotion, and personal lubricant) and homecare
products (e.g., cleaning spray), and markets them to consumers in the
United States.110 Truly Organic manufactures some of these products itself;
it also purchases some finished products from wholesalers and packages
them for retail sale.111 Truly Organic sells these products on its website as
well as on third-party websites.112
On September 13, 2019, the FTC filed a complaint against Truly
Organic, invoking § 5(a) of the FTC Act.113 The complaint alleged that, from
2015 to 2019, Truly Organic falsely advertised its products as “certified
organic,” “USDA organic,” “USDA certified organic,” and containing
“100% organic ingredients”—when, in fact, none of Truly Organic’s
products had ever been certified as organic by the USDA NOP, and some
do not contain any organic ingredients at all.114 It further alleged that, in
addition to directly making these false claims, Truly Organic had distributed
press kits to third parties (e.g., social media influencers) containing the false
claims, which the third parties then disseminated on social media channels.115
The complaint further claimed that in 2016, the USDA had issued a
Notice of Warning to Truly Organic and its Chief Executive Officer, Maxx
108. Moonlight Slumber, LLC, 164 F.T.C. 869, 901–04 (2017).
109. Id.
110. Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable Relief ¶¶ 6,9, FTC v. Truly
Organic Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23832, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2019).
111. See id. (noting Truly Organic’s “products fall into two categories: (1) products that they
‘make’ by purchasing wholesale bath, beauty, and home products online, adding ingredients to
increase visual appeal, and repackaging; and (2) ‘bath bombs’ and soaps that they purchase as
finished products from online wholesalers and resell at a substantial markup”).
112. See id. ¶ 10 (pointing out websites such as “ulta.com, urbanoutfitters.com,
nordstrom.com, and aerie.com”).
113. See id. at ¶ 28 (“Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), prohibits ‘unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.’”).
114. Id. at ¶ 31. The Complaint also alleges false “vegan” claims.
115. See id. at ¶¶ 16, 33–34 (“Defendants have distributed the promotional
materials . . . to third parties for use in the marketing and sale of Defendants’ products. In so
doing, Defendants have provided the means and instrumentalities to these third parties for
the commission of deceptive acts or practices.”).
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Harley Appelman, stating that Truly Organic was not “a certified organic
operation” and, therefore, was prohibited from advertising its products as
“USDA organic” or “certified organic.”116 The complaint alleged that,
despite the Notice of Warning, Truly Organic continued its deceptive
“organic” marketing campaign until May 2019, when the FTC informed the
company that it had begun an investigation.117
On September 18, 2019, five days after the FTC filed the complaint, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued a
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment and
Order Closing Case.118 The Order prohibited Truly Organic and Appelman
from making false or unsubstantiated “organic,” “vegan,” or other health or
environmental claims regarding their products in the future and from
providing third parties the means and instrumentalities to do so.119 The
Order imposed a monetary penalty of $1.76 million—the FTC’s first penalty
collected for false “organic” claims.120 The Commission voted 5-0 to
approve the filing of the complaint and proposed Stipulated Final Order.
Commissioner Rohit Chopra issued a separate statement emphasizing that
Truly Organic’s conduct had “distorted competition for organic products,
inflicting harm on honest producers” as well as consumers.121
As shown by the history of FTC enforcement actions involving
environmental marketing, there has never been a lack of unscrupulous
marketers that are willing to deceive consumers to gain an unfair advantage
over competitors. While Moonlight Slumber and Truly Organic may be extreme
examples of deceptive “organic” claims in marketing made at the expense of
vulnerable populations, such as babies and pregnant women, it is unrealistic
to assume that they are isolated cases. More likely, they are emblematic of
the latest trend in greenwashing—the misuse of buzzwords like “organic”
and “vegan”—which the FTC must take further action to address.
116. See id. at ¶ 18 (“On June 16, 2016, the USDA issued a Notice of Warning to
Defendants confirming that Truly Organic ‘is not a certified organic operation, but
represented its products as such on product labels and company website.’”).
117. See id. at ¶ 23 (“Until the FTC contacted Defendants in May 2019, Truly
Organic’s website incorporated the statement ‘100% Organic Ingredients—Truly Organic’
in its metadata.”).
118. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment; Order
Closing Case, FTC v. Truly Organic Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23832 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2019).
119. Id. at 2–3.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Press Release, Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Statement on In re Truly Organic (Sept.
19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1544655/commis
isoner_rohit_chopra_statement_on_truly_organic_sept_19_2019.pdf.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

Greenwashing hurts business competitors, consumers, and the
environment. It is well documented that even isolated instances of
greenwashing can make consumers skeptical of all products marketed as
“green,” and can lead consumers to question not only the supposed ecoattributes of those products, but all claims about those products made in
marketing materials.122 Purchasers of “green” products are not the only
ones who are affected; exposure to fraudulent “green” marketing materials
can leave broad swathes of consumers confused, dissatisfied, and disloyal.123
If allowed to continue, greenwashing can ultimately lead consumers to
avoid products that are marketed as “green.”124 Frankly, this is a shame
given the magnitude of environmental challenges and the importance and
urgency of reducing the environmental impact of consumptive activities.
Because greenwashing can have far-reaching impacts on consumer
purchasing, the problem of fraudulent or deceptive “organic” claims
regarding nonagricultural products affects more than the businesses and
consumers operating in that sector. Many businesses and numerous
consumers are impacted due to the effect on consumer decisionmaking that
can then artificially affect competition and opportunity.
This section of the Essay offers three recommendations for reducing
unfounded and deceptive “organic” claims in the marketing of
nonagricultural products. First, the FTC should take immediate steps to
tighten its investigation and enforcement oversight regarding “organic”
claims and to improve coordination with the USDA NOP. Second, the FTC
should add provisions regarding “organic” claims to its next revision of the
Green Guides, which is slated for revision in 2022. Finally, in the longer
term, the FTC should consider making the Green Guides into legislative
rules, similar to the NOP regulations.
A. Enhanced FTC Oversight of “Organic” Claims and Improved Coordination
with USDA NOP
The gap in regulatory oversight of “organic” claims for nonagricultural
products exposed by Moonlight Slumber and Truly Organic needs to be closed.
As those cases showed, the FTC’s historical approach of deferring to the
USDA NOP on all things “organic” left the door open for fraudulent and
122. Hendy Mustiko Aji & Bayu Sutikno, The Extended Consequence of Greenwashing: Perceived
Consumer Skepticism, 10 INT’L J. BUS. & INFO. 433, 461, 463 (2015).
123. Marta Pagán Martínez et. al, Fuzzy Inference System to Study the Behavior of the Green
Consumer Facing the Perception of Greenwashing, 242 J. CLEANER PROD., Aug. 31, 2019, at 20.
124. Id.
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deceptive claims. The FTC and USDA should continue to work towards
improved coordination in their oversight of “organic” products. To this
end, the agencies should more clearly delineate what constitutes an
“agricultural product” within the scope of the NOP and what does not.
Although the NOP regulations define “agricultural product,” 125 the
Moonlight Slumber and Truly Organic cases reveal a gray area in which neither
the FTC nor the USDA has been proactively addressing fraudulent or
deceptive claims.
Apart from coordination with the USDA, there are some steps that the
FTC could—if it has sufficient desire and resources to do so—implement on
its own to help curb fraudulent “organic” and other “green” claims. If
budgetary conditions allow, the FTC could focus its hiring efforts on
additional technical staff with expertise in environmental sustainability who
could review environmental claims in marketing and analyze their potential
environmental impact. Also, the FTC could launch a task force to tackle
deceptive environmental claims, as it has done recently for other areas of
concern, such as anticompetitive behaviors in the technology industry.126 At
a minimum, in the short term, the FTC could develop a webpage that offers
the public a portal for submitting complaints and viewing investigation and
enforcement reports, similar to the USDA NOP website.127
B. Revising the Green Guides to Address “Organic” Claims
According to the regulatory review schedule published in the Federal
Register in May 2019, the FTC plans to initiate the next revision of the
Green Guides in 2022.128 The foundation is well laid for the addition of a
section on “organic” claims. As explained in Section III above, the FTC
considered adding a section on “organic” claims in the 2012 revision of the
Green Guides, but ultimately decided not to on grounds that it had
insufficient evidence that consumers were being deceived by “organic”

125. As noted above, 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2019) provides that an “agricultural product” is
an “agricultural commodity or product, whether raw or processed, including any commodity
or product derived from livestock, that is marketed in the United States for human or
livestock consumption.”
126. Press Release, FTC, FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to
Monitor Technology Markets (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2019/02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-task-force-monitor-technology.
127. See National Organic Program, USDA, https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/program
s-offices/national-organic-program (last visited Aug. 12, 2020).
128. Regulatory Review Schedule, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,746, 18,747 (May 2, 2019).
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claims.129 The findings of the subsequent FTC/USDA co-funded study and
public roundtable, together with the fraud exposed in the Moonlight Slumber
and Truly Organic cases, strongly support the FTC including guidance on
“organic” claims in the next revision of the Green Guides. In so doing, the
FTC could consider developing an accreditation and certification program
for manufacturers of “organic” nonagricultural products similar to the
certification of “organic” growers by accredited certifiers under the NOP,
which has largely been successful in maintaining the integrity of “organic”
claims for agricultural products.130
The FTC has, in fact, already begun revising its industry-specific
interpretive guidance documents to include “organic” claims. In 2018, the
FTC revised its Guides for the Jewelry, Precious Metals, and Pewter
Industries (Jewelry Guides) to include a new section on “organic” pearls. The
Jewelry Guides, like the Green Guides, is an interpretive guidance document
that advises marketers without being a binding regulation.131 The Jewelry
Guides now state that “it is unfair or deceptive to use the term ‘organic’ to
describe, identify, or refer to an imitation pearl, unless the term is qualified
in such a way as to make clear that the product is not a natural or cultured
pearl.”132 By updating the Jewelry Guides to address “organic” pearls, the
FTC has taken an initial step towards reducing fraudulent and deceptive
claims for nonagricultural products.
Importantly, the FTC has shown an intention to keep abreast of changing
conditions in the marketplace. In fall 2018 and spring 2019, the FTC held
Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (CCP
Hearings). These hearings primarily focused on the FTC’s role in the face of
rapidly-changing technology, with many topics centering on antitrust law and
consumer privacy and protection.133 Although the CCP Hearings did not
specifically address environmental marketing or “organic” claims, they
indicate that the FTC wants to keep pace with changing consumer preferences
and to be mindful of the accompanying new opportunities for fraud.
129. Green Guides Press Release, supra note 74 (stating that it lacked a sufficient basis,
including consumer perception evidence, upon which to provide guidance on certain organic
claims); see also BUREAU OF ECON. & BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., supra note 77, at 5.
130. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.400 (2019).
131. 16 C.F.R. § 23.0(d) (2019).
132. 16 C.F.R. § 23.21(e).
133. See Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, FTC,
www.ftc.gov/policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection (last visited Aug. 11, 2020)
(“The Federal Trade Commission held a series of public hearings during the fall 2018–spring
2019 examining whether broad-based changes in the economy, evolving business practices,
new technologies, or international developments might require adjustments to competition
and consumer protection law, enforcement priorities, and policy.”).
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C. Formalizing the Green Guides as Legislative Rules
Looking further forward, the FTC should consider formalizing the
Green Guides as legislative rules. The FTC’s decision in the early 1990s
to tackle rampant fraud and deception in “green” marketing through an
industry guide, rather than a binding regulation, made sense because it
allowed the FTC to begin addressing the problem more quickly. But for
the past thirty years, the Green Guides have remained in an ill-defined,
hybrid status as de facto rules that do not actually have the force of law. As
discussed above, this has led to problems regarding preemption,
enforcement, and judicial review.
Now is the time to give the Green Guides more teeth—not only to help
prevent fraudulent “organic” claims, but to curb whatever yet-unseen
greenwashing tactics lay around the corner.
The FTC’s limited
investigation, enforcement, and legal resources could be deployed more
effectively if the Green Guides were legally binding and independently
enforceable, without requiring a separate showing by the FTC that each
Green Guides violation is also a violation of § 5 of the FTC Act. The NOP,
which has been largely successful at preventing fraudulent and deceptive
claims regarding organic agricultural products, is implemented pursuant to
binding USDA regulations. Many scholars agree that formalizing the Green
Guides as binding regulations would provide a variety of benefits for both
the marketplace and consumers.134
As discussed in Section II, the rulemaking process prescribed by the FTC
Improvement Act is lengthy, involving advanced notice of the proposed
rulemaking and the potential for extensive written and oral testimony.135 To
this end, the most efficient option for the Green Guides to become legislative
rules is through a congressional mandate. If Congress passes a statute
directing the FTC to promulgate a specific regulation, then the FTC is
exempt from many rulemaking procedural requirements. At present, there
does not appear to be any activity in Congress regarding such a bill. In the
absence of a congressional mandate, the FTC would be required to follow
the FTC Improvement Act rulemaking process when making the Green
134. See Lauren C. Avallone, Comment, Green Marketing: The Urgent Need for Federal
Regulation, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 685, 697–98 (2006); Jessica Fliegelman, Note, The Next
Generation of Greenwash: Diminishing Consumer Confusion Through a National Eco-Labeling Program, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1037 (2010); Gibson, supra note 5, at 434.
135. For reference, it took the FTC nine years to promulgate the Credit Practices Rule
pursuant to this process—by which point, elements of it were already outdated. See Paul H.
Luehr, Comment, Guiding the Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Regulating
Environmental Advertising, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 311, 329 (1992).
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Guides into legislative rules. Although it is unlikely that the FTC will take
action to formalize the Green Guides in the current deregulatory political
climate,136 the upcoming elections makes this a space to watch.
CONCLUSION
This Essay argues that more robust oversight by the FTC is needed to
address the persistent problem of fraudulent and deceptive environmental
claims in marketing. Because even isolated instances of greenwashing can
make consumers skeptical of all products that are marketed as “green,” it is
critical—from the standpoints of consumer protection, business competition,
and environmental sustainability—to curb these abuses.
This Essay offers three recommendations. First, it calls for improved
coordination between the FTC and USDA regarding “organic” claims for
nonagricultural products. Second, it makes a strong case for including
guidelines for “organic” claims in the 2022 revision of the Green Guides.
Finally, it argues that the FTC should work to formalize the Green Guides
as binding regulations, rather than nonbinding interpretive guidance, as the
USDA has done for the NOP regulations.
If implemented, these recommendations may have far-reaching, positive
impacts on consumer practices. More robust regulatory oversight of
environmental marketing will prevent fraud, bolster consumer demand for
sustainable goods and services, and incentivize manufacturers to innovate in
order to meet this demand, all at a time when the stakes could not be higher.

136. See President Donald J. Trump’s Deregulatory Actions are Benefitting American Families, Workers,
and Businesses, WHITE HOUSE (June 28, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statement
s/president-donald-j-trumps-historic-deregulatory-actions-are-benefiting-american-familiesworkers-and-businesses. Although the FTC is an independent agency within the Executive
Branch, the President has a degree of influence over its Commissioners and agenda. Id.

